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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Moses Shepherd appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Fourth District Court, and denial of his motion for a new trial, after he was convicted by a 
jury of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, and criminal mischief, a class B 
misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Moses Shepherd was charged by criminal information filed in Fourth District 
Court on February 4, 2005 with aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-203; and criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-106(2) (R. 2-1). 
A preliminary hearing was held on May 31, 2005 and the question of bindover 
was taken under advisement (R. 24). On May 31, 2005 Judge Samuel McVey issued a 
written over binding both charges over for trial upon a finding of probable cause (R. 28-
26). Shepherd filed a motion to quash the bindover on August 5, 2005 (R. 69-65). 
Shepherd filed a motion in limine in regards to his criitiinal convictions, which 
occurred more than ten years previous, pursuant to Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence (R. 42-40). Shepherd also filed a request for disclosure of any evidence the 
State would be seeking admission at trial under Rule 404(b) §f the Utah Rules of 
Evidence (R. 44). 
On September 29-30, 2005 a jury trial was held with Judge McVey presiding (R. 
99-97, 107-06). After deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged on 
both counts (R. 109-08). 
On November 22, 2005 Shepherd was sentenced to five years to life in the Utah 
State Prison on the aggravated burglary charge, and 180 day$ on the criminal mischief 
charge as a class B misdemeanor (R. 147-45). 
On December 2, 2005 Shepherd filed a motion for ne^ v trial in regards to the juror 
issue—specifically, the trial court's failure to grant a mistrial concerning the juror's 
recognition of Shepherd as a person who had threatened her husband with a gun several 
years earlier (R. 151-49). On February 3, 2006 he filed a supplemental memorandum (R. 
165-53). The State did not reply to the motion. On July 6, 2006 Judge McVey issued a 
written ruling and order denying the motion (R. 176-69). 
On July 11, 2006 Shepherd filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court (R. 
178). This matter was subsequently poured over to this Court by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Basic Facts Surrounding the Underlying Offenses 
Darren Ringel a Provo City police officer responded to the Macaroni Grill at 
approximately 3:50 a.m. because a business security alarm had sounded (R. 183: 83-85). 
Officers had responded there on previous alarms due to the To-Go door not closing 
properly and getting blown by the wind (R. 183: 111, 147). He couldn't see anybody 
inside the building as he approached from the North so he continued eastbound to the 
front of the buildiag (R. 183: 85). While he was waiting on the front patio for a second 
officer to arrive, the To-Go door, which was located on the patio, opened and suddenly 
Shepherd was "standing right in front o f him (R. 183: 88-90). Ringel stepped back as 
both of them were surprised and Shepherd exclaimed, "Oh shit!" (R. 183: 90-91). 
Shepherd was wearing a gray T-shirt and jeans (R. 183: 122). 
Shepherd immediately turned, jumped over a railing, and ran (R. 183: 91). Ringel 
contacted dispatch and pursued Shepherd on foot, yelling "Police. Stop" (R. 183: 91-92). 
As they are running, Ringel loses track of Shepherd's hands, which concerns him (R. 
183: 93-94). When they came into close contact a minute or so later, Ringel could see 
Shepherd had something in his right hand (R. 183: 95, 108). Shepherd turned and 
pivoted towards him, swinging with something pointed towards Ringel, so Ringel "hit 
him as hard as [he] could and [gave] him a big shove" (R. 183: 95-96, 120). Shepherd 
did not make contact with Ringel as he swung the object (R. 183: 120). Ringel was "a 
hundred percent confident" that Shepherd was trying to stab him (R. 183: 125-26). 
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Shepherd landed on his back and as he was reaching fcir something, Ringel jumped 
on his back, trying to control that hand and yelling at him to get his hand behind his back 
(R. 183: 96, 98). Ringel saw a screwdriver about a foot from where Shepherd's hand was 
reaching (R. 183: 96). Ringel then struck Shepherd twice in tiie back part of his ribs and 
Shepherd put both hands behind his back and said, "You got me" (R. 183: 98). 
Shepherd was handcuffed (R. 183: 99). Ringel testified that he was wearing 
brown garden-type cloth gloves (R. 183: 99). Ringel did not notice the gloves on 
Shepherd as he came out of the restaurant (R. 183: 100). Ringel obtained Shepherd's 
name and inquired if he was all right or needed any medical attention (R. 183: 100). 
Shepherd told him he was "fine" (R. 183: 101). Shepherd was searched and a cell phone 
and little pocket flashlight was discovered in his pocket (R. 183: 101). Shepherd was 
wearing a backpack and it was still secured to his back (R. 1$4: 113-14). The officers 
subsequently cut the straps to take it off after Shepherd was $ecured (R. 184: 114). 
Shepherd was placed in the back of a patrol vehicle and was read his Miranda 
rights (R. 183: 102). Shepherd told him he was walking by the restaurant and needed to 
use the bathroom, that he thought somebody was inside so h^ entered (R. 183: 103). 
Ringel testified that initially Shepherd told him he used one door but then changed his 
story and indicated he went in the other door (R. 183: 103). 
Back at the restaurant, officers discovered a rock laying just inside by the 
emergency door, whose window pane was broken, and glass on the floor in the same area 
(R. 183: 104, 142). In addition, the cash register had been pried open with some kind of 
object (R. 183: 105, 127). Shepherd indicated he did not kn^w anything about the broken 
window or about the cash register (R. 183: 108). Shepherd had "little sparkles on the 
bottom of [his tennis] shoes... which could have been shards of glass" (R. 183: 109, 126). 
Ringel did not observe anybody in the parking lot or around the restaurant other 
than Shepherd (R. 183: 125). 
Parties stipulated that screwdriver is capable of causing bodily injury or death, but not 
that it is necessarily a dangerous weapon (R. 184: 25). 
Andrea Olsen, who at the time of the incident was the service manager at 
Macaroni Grill, responded to the restaurant (R. 183: 135). She had "closed" the night 
before, meaning she checked and locked all the doors and set the security alarm after the 
business closed at about 12:30 a.m. (R. 183: 136-37). She also had taken the money from 
the cash registers and placed it in the safe (R. 183: 137). The restaurant lights are 
operated by automatic timer (R. 183: 140). 
When Olsen arrived at the restaurant after the alarm had gone off, she was taken 
around by officers and shown the damage (R. 183: 141). She observed the shattered 
glass and that the cash register by the To Go door had been pried open with something— 
was bent open (R. 183: 142). She never gave Shepherd permission to be inside the 
restaurant after closing that night (R. 183: 144). 
Christian Holman, another manager, also responded to the restaurant (R. 183: 
153). He observed the same things with the emergency door and cash register (R. 183: 
153-54). He also did not give Shepherd permission to enter the restaurant (R. 183: 161-
62). 
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Moses Shepherd testified that on the night of July 31-August 1, 2004 he was 
camping on the Provo River (R. 184: 51). He awoke in the middle of the night needing to 
use a bathroom (R. 184: 52). He heard some noise and thought that a cleaning crew 
might be over at one of the restaurants, and rather than walk a half a mile or so to the 
public restrooms, he decided to walk over to the restaurants and ask if he could use their 
restroom (R. 184: 52-54). He had no idea of the time at this ^oint (R. 184: 55). 
The To Go door at Macaroni Grill was ajar a couple of inches and he walked in, 
figuring the cleaning crew was there (R. 184: 57). He called out, but nobody was inside 
(R. 184: 58). He heard a low, constant noise and turned aroupd and started to exit the 
building (R. 184:58). 
As he exited he saw a man with a shaved head and da^k clothing (R. 184: 59). It 
was dark and the man said, "Hey, you," and made a gesture tjiat scared Shepherd so he 
took off (R. 184: 59). Subsequently as he was being pursue^ he heard the man yell, 
"Police officer" (R. 184: 60). He stopped and turned (R. 184: 61). He was wearing his 
backpack and it slipped off his shoulder (R. 184: 63). He did not have anything in his 
hand nor did he attempt to strike the officer with his hand or stab him with something— 
although he could see how it may have appeared like he was coming up to hit him (R. 
184: 63, 96). He didn't believe he was wearing his gloves arid thinks they were in his 
backpack, but he wasn't sure (R. 184: 83-84). He denied having a screwdriver or 
reaching for any such object, although he saw a shiny object a few feet from where he 
was laying (R. 184:98-101). 
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B. Specific Facts Relating to Issue on Appeal 
As part of the voir dire process the name of defendant was disclosed, and he was 
present at court with counsel (R. 183: 2-3). Shepherd was also identified by his counsel 
as a potential witness (R. 183: 20). Prospective Juror No. 3, R. Swenson, did not indicate 
she knew or was acquainted with Shepherd at this time. She was passed for cause by 
both parties and was seated on the jury (R. 183: 50, 63). 
On the second morning of trial Swenson advised the bailiff she wished to make a 
disclosure to the trial court (R. 176). Accordingly, Swenson, and the parties joined Judge 
McVey in his chambers (R. 184: 4-). The trial court indicated that Swenson "indicated 
that she had awakened in the middle of the night and had thought that her husband might 
know the defendant in this case" (R. 184: 4). The trial court also noted that when they 
began this process Swenson "was in tears" but that she seemed to calm down upon being 
told it was "fine" (R. 184: 15). 
Swenson stated, "The name Moses Shepherd just kind of came to me in the middle 
of the night" (R. 184: 4). "I guess what triggered it was, you know, yesterday when you 
were asking that there is another lady that, you know, thought she—it sounded familiar 
and somebody said it could have been in the paper and an obituary or something like 
that.... [I]t just hit me, if he's from Springville, I think that he went to school with my 
husband" (R. 184:4-5). 
Months earlier—approximately a year, Swenson's husband had told her that he 
knew the defendant, and they had a confrontation when they were younger— 
approximately 25 years earlier (R. 184: 5, 6, 9). The trial court asked how Swenson felt 
after the conversation with her husband and she indicated, thjit it was like "[0]h, really? 
You know, I didn't just didn't really, you know, it's just high school crap, or, you know, 
stuff like that" (R. 184: 6, 7). She then gave more details. Tfre "big fight" took place in a 
bar called Seniors, that she was told Shepherd had "pulled a gun out," and that her 
husband said he was "scary" (R. 184: 6-8). "There were a whole lot of people and it was 
just a real scary situation. It scared him [her husband] pretty bad. And that's one of 
those situations, you know, he said he'll never forget, you know" (R. 184: 7). She did not 
know her husband at the time of the incident (R. 184: 8). 
This conversation "hit" her in the middle of the night |(R. 184: 7). Swenson told 
the trial court she did not discuss the matter or the trial with tier husband (R. 184: 7). 
Upon questioning, she also indicated that she could remain impartial, and hold the State 
to its burden of proof (R. 184: 8-10). 
The trial court excused Swenson, and Shepherd's couhsel moved for a mistrial (R. 
184: 10-11). Shepherd is from Springville and remembered the incident (R. 184: 11). He 
denied the incident took place at Seniors, rather it occurred ^t the Stalker Club (R. 184: 
17-18). He didn't recognize her yesterday but now remembered meeting Swenson at the 
Club, and he remembers her husband (R. 184: 18). He remefnbered dancing with her and 
that the husband came in with a gun looking for her (R. 184: 18). He denied ever taking 
a gun to a bar (R. 184: 18). 
The trial court called Swenson back into chambers (R. 184: 19). She also denied 
ever seeing Shepherd before trial (R. 184: 19). Judge McVey also instructed her not to 
discuss the matter with the other jurors (R. 184: 20). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Shepherd asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because there was an error or 
impropriety that had a substantial adverse effect upon his right to an impartial jury. The 
trial court's conclusion that there was no failure by Swenson to give an honest or truthful 
answer to a material question on voir dire is clearly erroneous. In addition, Judge McVey 
abused his discretion in concluding that disclosure by Swenson at the time of voir dire 
would not have supported a challenge for cause. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
SHEPHERD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL UNDER 
THE TEST ESTABLISHED IN McDONOUGH POWER EQUIPMENT 
V. GREENWOOD. 
Shepherd asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because there was an error or 
impropriety that had a substantial adverse effect upon his right to an impartial jury. See 
U.R.Cr.P. 24(a) (new trial in situations where "in the interest of justice there is any error 
or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party"); United 
States Constitution, Amend. VI; Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 12. This issue is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 
1992). 
Post-trial challenges in regards to a juror based on alleged misstatements or 
omissions during voir dire are considered under the test first articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court in McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.\ v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 
548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). See also, West vj Holley, 2004 UT 97, f 11, 
103 P.3d 708; Thomas, 830 P.2d at 245. Under McDonough^ a new trial is mandated if 
Shepherd demonstrates that: (1) "a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on 
voir dire," and (2) "a correct response would have provided ^ valid basis for a challenge 
for cause." 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S.Ct. at 850. Utah courts h t^ve also substituted the word 
"truthful" for "honest" at times. See State v. Shipp, 2005 UT 35, <I 19, 116 P.3d 317; 
West92(m\JT97 atlll. 
A. Juror Swenson failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire. 
In this case, the trial court concluded that the first prolog of the McDonough test— 
whether a juror failed to give an honest answer to a material Question on voir dire—had 
not been met. The trial court found that Swenson "did not consciously omit her 
knowledge of defendant because she did not recall the event in question during voir dire. 
She simply did not think of the incident described by her husband. If one cannot 
remember something, how can failure to answer about that tiding be objectively 
dishonest?" (R. 172). The trial court also found that this first] prong had not been met 
because no one on voir dire asked Swenson "if she had ever heard of defendant" (R. 172). 
Although the trial court recognized that he had specifically a^ked the jury panel if anyone 
had any relationship or acquaintance with Shepherd, and if ahy of them had heard of the 
case outside of court (R, 172). "'To show clear error, the [contesting party] must marshal 
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all of the evidence in support of the trial court's finding and then demonstrate that the 
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support 
the findings against an attack.'" Shipp, 2005 UT 35 at f 20 (quoting State v. 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996)). 
Shepherd asserts that the trial court has abused his discretion in concluding that 
Swenson failed to answer a material question honestly. In regards to this first prong 
under McDonough, this court reviews "the trial court's decision under a clearly erroneous 
standard." Shipp, 2005 UT 35 at f 20 (citing Thomas, 830 P.2d at 245). 
Under Utah case law, "a finding of juror misconduct only if a prospective juror is 
aware that her answers are false" is not required. Thomas, 830 P.2d at 246. Rather "a 
juror's 'honesty' or 'dishonesty' [is] determined from an objective perspective." Id. 
"The emphasis should be on the juror's lack of partiality rather than on her intent. See 
People v. Diaz, 152 Cal.App.3d 926, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77, 85 (1984) (right to trial by 
impartial jury is independent from intent of juror to conceal)." Id. 
Shepherd asserts that the trial court's conclusion that there was no failure by 
Swenson to give an honest or truthful answer to a material question on voir dire is clearly 
erroneous: 
First, while a "juror clearly cannot fail to answer honestly a material question if 
the juror was not asked a question regarding the subject matter alleged to have gone 
undisclosed," Shepherd asserts that is not the case here and the trial court committed 
clear error in concluding that because Swenson had not specifically been asked if she had 
ever "heard" of the defendant that the first prong of the McDonough test does not apply. 
Thomas, 830 P.2d at 246. It is true that Swenson and the jur^ panel were not specifically 
asked, "Have any of you ever heard of the defendant?" 
Nonetheless, the trial court acknowledges that he did ^sk her and the panel other 
questions. However, he failed to consider these questions and dialogue in his 
determination. For example, the jury panel was asked, "Do any of you have a social, 
religious, neighborly or other such acquaintance with any of the folks just mentioned 
[attorneys and witnesses—including the defendant]?" (R. 183: 23). 
In addition, the panel was also asked if they had "heard" of the case outside of 
court, and if they had formed any opinions about it (R. 183: 31). Another prospective 
juror began to raise his hand in regards to the second questioh (R. 183: 40). Defense 
counsel noticed this and the juror was questioned about it and the following dialogue 
ensued: 
COURT: Have you read about this case or heard about this case outside of 
court, Ms. Phelon? 
JUROR: I don't remember if I read about it or he^rd about it, but I believe 
when you said who the Defendant was I know I've heard or read that name before. 
COURT: Okay. Now the Defendant's name is Mdses Shepherd. 
JUROR: Shepherd. 
COURT: Do you remember in what context? 
JUROR: I don't remember. I just know that I've heard that name, and my 
husband reads the paper faithfully every day. I don't read the paper faithfully every day 
so in the back of my mind something is telling me he, you kijow, read an article to me 
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and it was in it or whatever. I don't know. I am just saying the name sounded very 
familiar to me when you read the name, and it was probably through the media" 
(R. 183: 40-41). Further questioning and discussion also took place with this juror. 
Shepherd asserts that these questions and this discussion put Swenson and the rest 
of the jury panel on notice that any prior knowledge of the defendant was relevant and 
important to disclose. In fact, Swenson indicated that it was this discussion that triggered 
her memory and likely made her come forth with the information (R. 184: 4-5). 
Accordingly, this is not a situation where the subject matter of the information that 
should have been disclosed was not raised with the jury panel. See Thomas, 830 P.2d at 
246 (Prospective jurors were asked two questions that should have made juror aware of 
need to bring the incident to the trial court's attention). 
At the time of voir dire and jury selection, Swenson honestly did not recall the 
relationship between her husband and Shepherd, and the prior fight where Shepherd 
allegedly pulled a gun, in spite of the fact she—like the rest of the panel—had been asked 
about acquaintances and relationships between themselves, the parties and witnesses, and 
had been put on notice that any knowledge of the defendant or this case was relevant. 
Nevertheless, the trial court committed clear error in concluding that because she had not 
recalled the prior relationship, she did not fail to answer a material question honestly or 
truthfully. 
In Thomas, the Utah Supreme Court chose not to interpret McDonough as 
requiring a finding of juror misconduct only if a prospective juror is aware her answers 
are false. 830 P.2d at 246. Rather they chose to adopt "that a juror's 'honesty' or 
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'dishonesty' be determined from an objective perspective. The emphasis should be on 
the juror's lack of partiality rather than on her intent." Id. Accordingly the Utah court in 
Thomas, concluded that although the juror's "nondisclosure was purely inadvertent, she 
nonetheless failed to answer a material question accurately. J-Ier intent or lack of intent is 
irrelevant. We therefore conclude that the first prong of the McDonough test is satisfied." 
Id. 
Shepherd asserts that the same analysis applied by thel Utah Supreme Court in 
Thomas is applicable here. Swenson did not recall the relationship between her husband 
and the defendant at the time of jury selection, nor did she repall her knowledge of a prior 
fight involving the two of them where the defendant allegedly pulled out a gun. 
However, her silence—due to her lack of recall at the moment—meant that she failed to 
answer material questions honestly and truthfully. The fact fhat she had no intent to 
mislead is irrelevant. This information, which was not disclosed at the time of voir dire, 
goes to the heart of her impartiality. Accordingly, this Court should conclude that the 
trial court committed clear error in finding that the first prolog was not satisfied. 
B. Honest disclosure by Swenson would have supported a challenge for cause. 
The second prong of the McDonough test is whether utruthful answers, if known at 
the time [of voir dire] would have supplied a valid basis for removing the juror for 
cause." West v. Holley, 2004 UT 97, f 11, 103 P.3d 708. This prong is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard. Id. 
Shepherd asserts that Judge McVey abused his discretion in concluding disclosure 
at the time of voir dire would not have supported a challenge for cause. Although trial 
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courts are afforded considerable discretion in ruling on motions to dismiss jurors for 
cause, appellate courts have "encouraged them to err on the side of dismissing 
questionable jurors." West, 2004 UT 97 at 112. "When a potential juror makes 
statements that raise a question about her ability to be impartial, the trial court must 
'either excuse her or further question her about these relationships and determine whether 
she could act impartially.'" State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, <fl 49, 55 P.3d 573 (quoting 
State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1992)). "Once comments are made which facially 
raise a question of partiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion occurs unless the 
challenged juror is removed by the court or unless a court of counsel investigates further 
and finds the inference rebutted; rebuttal of such an inference may be accomplished by a 
showing that the statement was merely the product of a 'light impression' and not one 
that would 'close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition.'" 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988). 
"Voir dire questioning is essential to choosing an impartial jury, and an impartial 
jury is essential to a fair trial as is an impartial judge. Indeed, the damaging effect of 
juror bias may be even more insidious than judicial bias because once biased jurors are 
seated, the effect of their bias is essentially undiscoverable and unremediable." State v. 
Saunders, 1999 UT 5, f 33, 992 P.2d 951. 'The most characteristic feature of prejudice 
is its inability to recognize itself." State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1984). 
Moreover, "Ruling that a prospective juror is qualified to sit simply because he says he 
will be fair ignores the common-sense psychological and legal reality of the situation. It 
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is not uncommon for people to believe that their 'biases' are }n fact nonbiased objective 
judgments that are true and correct." Saunders, 1999 UT 5 at f 35. 
In this case, Judge McVey concluded that Swenson's ^disclosure about her 
husband's experiences with defendant would not have supported a successful challenge 
for cause" (R. 170). The trial court based his decision on the following: Swenson's own 
testimony that she could be impartial, and that she would not; vote for a guilty verdict if 
the State did not meet its burden of proof (R. 170); the trial court's observations that her 
emotional state during the questioning in chambers was not related to the incident but to 
her fear that she might have done something wrong, and that the incident was merely a 
light impression in her mind (Id.); and finally, that the incident was remote in time and 
did not personally involve Swenson (Id.). 
In regards to the factors relied upon by the trial court. First, any evidence or 
attitude suggesting bias or prejudice "cannot be attenuated by the juror's determination 
that he can render an impartial verdict. The juror cannot be khe judge of his 
qualifications; this function is the responsibility of the trial qourt." State v. Brooks, 631 
P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981). See also, West, 2004 UT 97 atf[ 16. Accordingly, there 
must be "some other basis for overcoming the presumption Of bias." West, 2004 UT 97 
at^[17. 
The trial court also rebuffed Shepherd's arguments that Swenson was emotional 
during the in-chambers discussion by indicating that her emotional state was not related 
to the incident but to her fear of having done something wrong. Assuming the trial court 
is correct in his observations, that observation is really irrelevant to the issue of 
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impartiality and whether there would have been a valid basis for challenge for cause had 
she disclosed that she knew of a prior relationship between her husband and the 
defendant, including a fight between them where defendant pulled out a gun. 
Furthermore, the trial court only relied on Swenson's initial response to the 
conversation with her husband where he told her of the incident (R. 170; 184: 6-7). What 
the trial court failed to consider was the incident itself as it relates to this case. One, the 
incident made a sufficient impression on Swenson to awaken her in the middle of the 
night. Two, she disclosed that the incident scared her husband "pretty bad" and that it 
was "one of those situations, you know, he said he'll never forget" (R. 184: 7). Three, 
the incident itself involved a fight between her husband and the defendant where the 
defendant pulled a gun. The incident may have occurred twenty-five years ago, but it 
was significant enough that Swenson's husband remembered it all these years. It was 
"scary" enough he would never forget it. While Swenson may not have been personally 
involved in the incident, her husband—her closest relative—was involved; and according 
to her husband, he had a gun pulled on him by the defendant. Contrary to the trial court's 
findings, this is not the type of scenario that only creates light impressions. It is one that 
closes the mind against testimony that may be offered in opposition.'" State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988). 
Accordingly, Shepherd asserts this Court should conclude that the trial court 
abused his discretion in finding that timely disclosure by Swenson of the relationship 
between her husband and the defendant, including the fight involving a gun, would not 
have "supplied a valid basis for removing the juror for cause." West, 2004 UT 97 at f 11. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Valdez requests that this Court reverse his conviction and remand this case to the 
Fourth District Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of April, 2008. 
Margaret P: Lindsay 
Counsel for [Appellant 
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I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 10th day of April, 2008. 
4argaret P. Lind< M ^Li say 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UT7VH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. 
MOSES SHEPHERD, ) 
Defendant. ] 
) CA^E NUMBER: 05140052 
MEMORANDUM 
IN £UPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Hoh. Samuel D. McVey 
COMES NOW, MOSES SHEPHERD, by and through his attorney of record, 
Thomas H. Means, who hereby submits the following memorandum of points and 
authority in support of his Motion for New Trial, heretofore filed with this Court. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Trial of this matter was conducted on 29 and 30 September, 2005. At the 
beginning of the trial, with all prospective jurors present, the Court called "the case of 
the State against Shepherd". [Transcript of voir dire, September 29, 2005, page 3, lines 
2 - 3]. The Court further noted that "Mr. Shepherd is present". [Transcript of voir dire, 
September 29, 2005, page 3, lines 10-11]. As a part of the voir dire, the Court asked 
defense counsel to introduce himself, to identify the other attorneys in his office, to 
describe who he represented, and identify what witnesses he anticipated calling. The 
prospective jurors were instructed to advise the Court if any knew any of the persons 
identified. [Transcript of voir dire, September 29, 2005, page 20, lines 9-16]. 
Defendant's counsel identified himself, his fellow attorneys, and referred to "the 
defendant" as a possible witness. [Transcript of voir dire, September 29, 2005, page 
21, lines 9-17]. Prospective juror no. 3, Rebecca Swenson did not indicate she knew 
the Defendant. Juror Swenson was eventually passed for cause by both parties. 
[Transcript of voir dire, September 29, 2005, page 49, lines 12-14]. Neither party used 
a peremptory challenge as to juror Swenson and she was eventually seated on the jury 
which heard the evidence and rendered a verdict. [Transcript of voir dire, September 
29, 2005, page 62, lines 6-10]. 
On the second morning of trial juror Swenson advised the bailiff that she wished 
to make a disclosure to the Court. Based on her request, the Court conducted 
proceedings in chamber with juror Swenson, Defendant, and counsel for both parties. 
[See generally, Transcript of Proceedings in Chambers, September 30, 2005]. 
Juror Swenson disclosed that she had awaked during the night between the two 
days of trial with the realization that she had prior knowledge of the Defendant. [Tr. 3:17 
- 7:18]. She explained the Defendant's name was familiar and that he may have gone 
to high school with her husband. [Tr. 3:17 - 4:2]. She also explained that she and her 
husband had talked about the Defendant some months prior to the trial. [Tr. 4:3 - 5:7]. 
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Juror Swenson disclosed that her husband had told her that he and Defendant 
had been involved in a confrontation at a bar in Springvill^ and the Defendant had 
pulled a gun on him. [Tr. 5:16 - 7:18]. Juror Swenson saidlher husband had been 
scared by the Defendant and that her husband would nev^r forget the confrontation. 
[Tr. 5:19-21; 5:23; 6:22-25]. She explained the incident occurred 25 years ago before 
she had met her husband. [Tr. 8:18 - 23]. 
The Court asked juror Swenson if her knowledge of her husband's confrontation 
with defendant would impact her ability to serve impartially. Juror Swenson opined that 
she could remain impartial. [Tr. 7:19 - 8:14]. The prosecutor asked the juror if she could 
return a verdict of not guilty if the State failed to prove its ckse. The juror represented 
that she could. [Tr. 8:15 - 9:7]. Defendant's counsel asked no follow up questions. 
Defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial arguing th$t the core of the defense 
would be that Defendant was not dangerous (had not used or threatened the use of a 
dangerous weapon), that juror Swenson perceived that Defendant had threatened her 
husband with a dangerous weapon, that the juror was not nehabilitated simply by her 
own representations that she could still be fair, and that she would likely unconsciously 
influence other jurors. The prosecutor objected to the motion. [Tr. 9:21 -13:14]. 
The Court found that although the facts alleged in th£ case at trial were similar to 
the juror's account of the bar incident in that each involved claims that Defendant used 
a dangerous weapon against another, the remembered incident was remote; it did not 
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effect the juror at the time; she appeared to be agitated as much by the anxiety of 
having to report the matter to the Court as with the event itself; there was no juror 
misconduct in as much as she had not concealed her knowledge, rather she had 
remembered it after initial voir dire and voluntarily reported it at the earliest opportunity; 
and, her disclosure of her husband's encounter with Defendant would not have 
sustained a challenge for cause brought against her during initial voir dire because she 
retained the ability to follow the court's instructions and decide the case on the 
evidence. The Court thereupon denied the Motion. [Tr. 13:15 -16:6]. 
After ruling, the Court allowed Defendant and his counsel to confer out side of 
chambers. On returning, Defendant advised the Court that he remembered the incident 
raised by juror Swenson. Defendant told the Court the incident occurred in the early 
1980's, at a bar called the Stalker Club in Springville, that he remembered juror 
Swenson's husband, Greg, that he had danced with juror Swenson on the night in 
question, that Greg had a gun, and that he (Defendant) has never taken a gun to a bar. 
[Tr. 16:24 -17:16]. Juror Swenson was asked back into chambers. She was asked if 
she recognized Defendant. She denied ever seeing Defendant before trial. [Tr. 18:22 -
25]. She was also asked to reiterate when she had heard Defendant's name prior to 
trial. She answered it was when her husband had advised her of the incident in the bar. 
[Tr. 19:1 -9]. 
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Defendant renewed his motion for mistrial adding to his earlier argument that 
there was some doubt that juror Swenson was being candid and truthful with the Court. 
The prosecutor again argued against a mistrial. [Tr. 20:6 -122:7]. The Court sustained 
its denial of the motion stating that it was reconcilable that I both juror Swenson and 
Defendant were being honest - that while Defendant remembered meeting her, she did 
not remember meeting him1. The Court also noted the jurdr's willingness to come 
forward suggested she would come forward again if her memory were refreshed again. 
[Tr. 22:8-23:12]. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 24(a) allows for a new trial "in the interest of 
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon 
the rights of a party." State v Kooyman, 112 P.3d 1252, lf40 (Ut. Ct. App., 2005). The 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as Article I, Section 12 of 
the Constitution of Utah guarantee Defendant trial by an impartial jury. §77-1-6(1 )(f), 
Utah Code likewise mandates trial by an impartial jury. Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 21(b) requires that a verdict be unanimous. Utah Rules of Criminal 
\Juror Swenson maintained that the incident occurred before she met her 
husband [Tr. 7:6 - 7]. She stated she had first learned abo^t the incident a few months 
prior to trial when her husband told her about it. [Tr. 4:13-17]. While the Court may 
have misunderstood this aspect of her disclosure, as Deferfidant argues below, it is only 
relevant that juror Swenson failed to disclose her prior knowledge of Defendant during 
voir dire, and that she perceived him to be violent. The particulars of her memory are 
relatively unimportant. 
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Procedure Rule 18(e)(4) recognizes as grounds to challenge a prospective juror for 
cause "the existence of any ... other relationship between the prospective juror and any 
... person alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which 
relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the 
prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of 
favoritism." Rule 18(e)(14) also allows for a for-cause challenge when the prospective 
juror has a "state of mind ... that reasonably leadfs] the court to conclude the juror is not 
likely to act impartially." Rule 18(d) allows for peremptory challenges to prospective 
jurors for no reason. 
Defendant asserts he is entitled to a new trial because juror Swenson believed 
her husband had been victimized by the Defendant, she was not removed for cause, 
Defendant was prevented from removing her by peremptory challenge, and her 
remaining on the jury through verdict, had a substantial adverse effect on Defendant's 
right to be tried by an impartial jury. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held "that the test articulated in [McDonough 
Power Equipment, Inc. v Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548,556 (1984)] governs 'post-trial1 
challenges to a juror based on the juror's alleged misstatements or omissions during 
voir dire." State v Shipp, 116 P.3d 317 (Utah, 2005), citing to West v Holly, 103 P.3d 
708 (Utah, 2004). "The McDonough test mandates a new trial if the moving party 
demonstrates that (1) 'a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire,1 
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and (2) 'a correct response would have provided a valid bases for a challenge for 
cause."1 State v Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah, 1992), citing to McDonough, at 556. 
1. The first prong of the McDonough test: 
In ruling on the motion for mistrial, this Court found that "first, there's no juror 
misconduct because she did not disclose something or sh0 did not fail to disclose 
something during voir dire, that she recalled this was somejthing, it came to her in the 
middle of last night. Also, this morning she came directly to| us, and without discussing it 
to anybody else, told the bailiff she needed to talk to us, an|d came in and disclosed 
this. So she reported this as soon as she could, so there w&s no juror misconduct," [Tr. 
14:11 -19]. This Court appeared to be distinguishing betw0en a conscious omission 
and an inadvertent omission, finding that juror Swenson's was of the latter category and 
concluding that the first prong was therefore not established. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court, in Thomas, has determined that such a 
distinction is not merited. There, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new 
trial, determining that a juror "did not act with deceit or with a fraudulent state of mind in 
failing to disclose [a material fact] during voir dire questionihg[,]" but held "the trial judge 
placed undue weight on the subjective intent of the prospective juror." Id. The Thomas 
Court noted "[s]ome courts have interpreted McDonough to require a finding of juror 
misconduct only if a prospective juror is aware her answers are false. We think the 
better-reasoned approach mandates that a juror's 'honesty' or 'dishonesty' be 
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determined from an objective perspective. The emphasis should be placed on the 
juror's lack of partiality rather than on her intent. Although [the prospective juror's] 
nondisclosure was purely inadvertent, she nonetheless failed to answer a material 
question accurately. Her intent or lack of intent is irrelevant." (Citations omitted.) Id. 
Defendant argues that the reasoning of the Thomas court is sound. His right to 
due process and an impartial jury were equally impacted whether juror Swenson 
purposely or inadvertently failed to disclose facts that were material to either a for-
cause or peremptory challenge. It is clear in this case that juror Swenson, during voir 
dire, failed to disclose her memory of her husband's account of his earlier contact with 
Defendant. Her accurate answer would have been material to a determination of both 
whether she had a relationship with a person alleged to have been victimized by the 
defendant and whether she had a state of mind that would preclude her from acting 
impartially. Defendant would have undoubtedly benefitted from the knowledge of her 
account of the bar incident in his decision to exercise both a for-cause and a 
peremptory challenge as to her. The Thomas case holds that the juror's intent or lack of 
intent in failing to accurately disclose is irrelevant. Therefore, the first prong of the 
McDonough test was met.2 
2As noted above, during the in-chambers conference, evidence was admitted 
from the Defendant that he also remembered the bar incident but remembered that 
Juror Swenson was present, herself, that he had danced with her, and that it was her 
husband who came to the bar with a gun "looking for his old lady." [Tr. 16:22 -17:25]. 
Defendant believes it unlikely that juror Swenson would forget such an incident and that 
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2. The second prong of the McDonough test: 
"Once statements are made during voir dire that 'facially raise a question of 
partiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion occurs unless the challenged juror is 
removed by the court or counsel investigates further and fihds the inference rebutted.'" 
State v Wach, 24 P.3d 948,1f27 (Utah, 2001), quoting Statp v Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439,451 (Utah, 1988). "When a potential juror makes statements that raise a question 
about her ability to be impartial, the trial court must 'either Excuse her or further 
question her about these relationships and determine whether she could act 
impartially.'" State v Calliham, 55 P.3d 573 Tf49 (Utah, 200^), citing to State v Cox, 826 
P.2d 656,660 (Utah, 1992). 
Juror Swenson related an incident that, in turn, was related to her by her 
husband, that Defendant had "pulled a gun out" in an alteration at a bar. [Tr. 7:10 -
15]. She related that her husband said Defendant was "scary" [Tr. 5:19 - 20], that the 
bar incident was a "scary situation" [Tr.5:23, 6:22-23], and that "[i]t scared [her 
husband] pretty bad." [Tr.6:23]. She said her husband woulfl "never forget" the incident. 
[Tr. 6:25]. The case being tried involved an allegation that Qefendant had possessed or 
these discrepancies raise issues as to the juror's honesty. Nevertheless, Defendant 
also views the issue of her forthrightness as irrelevant owing to Thomas' holding that 
the focus is on the accuracy of her voir dire responses and not on her intent. Whether, 
this Court adopted the juror's version or the Defendant's version, it is undisputed that 
Juror Swenson did not accurately disclose her prior knowledge of Defendant during the 
original voir dire and Defendant was therefore denied the opportunity to timely address 
her perceptions. 
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used a dangerous weapon in the course of attempting, committing or fleeing from a 
burglary. Defendant asserts that juror Swenson's belated disclosure, even though 
voluntary, belied her bias that Defendant was prone to possessing and/or using 
dangerous weapons and that he was a "scary" person. Defendant further asserts that 
she should have been removed for cause unless her bias was rebutted. 
"Whenever the voir dire evokes a strong emotional response, there is posed a 
warning that the juror may not have a mental attitude of appropriate indifference to the 
party or cause before the court." West, supra, at fl16. After evidence of bias has been 
revealed, the court must probe further to determine if the juror's bias is "merely the 
product of a 'light impression' and not one that would 'close the mind against the 
testimony that may be offered in opposition'". State v Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah, 
1988), quoting State v Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah, 1980). "[H]owever, a 
presumption of bias cannot be rebutted solely by a juror's bare assurance of her own 
impartiality because a challenged juror cannot reasonably be expected to judge her 
own fitness to serve." West, supra, at fl15. Rather, "it is [the trial judge's] duty to see 
that the constitutional right of an accused to an impartial jury is safeguarded." State v 
Dixon, 560 P.2d 318,319-20 (Utah, 1977). "The court, not the juror, must determine a 
juror's qualifications." State v Brooks, 631 P.2d 878,884 (Utah, 1981). See also State v 
Jones, 734 P.2d 473,475 (Utah, 1987). 
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After juror Swenson's disclosure on the second morhing of trial, this Court asked 
her if she could still be fair and impartial; she answered that she was "a firm believer of 
giving a person the benefit of the doubt" and "I think I could be fair and impartial in this 
case because I think I could in all honesty." [Tr. 7:19 - 8:1^]. The prosecutor followed 
up by asking if she could return a verdict of not guilty if the State failed to prove 
Defendant's guilt, to which she responded "I could". [Tr. 8:£4 - 9:7]. Responding to 
Defense counsel's argument that the juror would have been removed for cause had her 
belated disclosure been revealed at the initial voir dire, this Court ruled that her answers 
to the Court's and the prosecutor's questioning would have rehabilitated her. [Tr. 15:16 -
16:5]. 
Defendant respectfully argues that this Court erred ir| its ruling that juror 
Swenson's bias was sufficiently rebutted. That determination was made solely on her 
own affirmations to two general questions - one from the C0urt and one from the 
prosecution. Her responses were not challenged or probed Ifurther. While she may have 
believed, intended, or even hoped, she could be fair and impartial, her statement "that 
she intends to be fair and impartiai ioses much of its meaning in VigVit of other testimony 
and facts which suggest a bias." West, supra, at 1J15-
Because Defendant has demonstrated that juror Swenson was subject to a 
successful challenge for cause, the second prong of the MdQonough test was also met 
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and prejudice has been established. State v Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah, 1994). 
Consequently, Defendant should be granted a new trial. 
3. Defendant was wrongfully prevented from exercising a peremptory challenge 
as to juror Swenson: 
"Voir dire examination has as its proper purpose both the detection of actual bias 
and the collection of data to permit informed exercise of the peremptory challenge." 
State v Taylor, 664 P.2d 439,447 (Utah, 1983); State v Saunders, 992 P.2d 951, 1J34 
(Utah, 1999). See also State v Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah, 1988). 
Had juror Swenson disclosed her knowledge of the bar incident during initial voir 
dire, and had this Court denied a challenge for cause, any competent counsel would 
have exercised his first peremptory challenge to remove her from the trail jury. 
Defendant recognizes that there is no constitutional right to a peremptory challenge. 
Frazier v United States, 335 U.S. 497,505 n.11 (1948). Nevertheless, all Defendants 
are afforded such challenges by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Because juror 
Swenson's disclosure was made after the trial jury had been sworn, Defendant was 
prevented from removing her with a peremptory challenge after this Court denied the 
challenge for cause. The denial of the exercise of the peremptory challenge of his 
choice substantially and adversely effected his right, as granted by the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Defendant should be granted a new trial for the alternative reason 
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that he was denied his right, by rule of procedure, to exercise his choice of peremptory 
challenges. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant should be granted a new trial, either because juror Swenson was not 
properly removed for cause or because Defendant was prevented from removing juror 
Swenson by way of peremptory challenge and because her remaining on the trial jury 
through verdict violated his right to an impartial jury. 
pated 2 February, 2006. 
T/homas H. Means 
Attorney for Defendant 
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RULING AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
C4se No. 051400527 
Judgje Samuel D. McVey 
Defendant timely filed a Motion for New Trial. However, thi Court granted defendant leave 
to delay submitting a memorandum in support of the motion so the defense could obtain a transcript. 
The defense has now filed its memorandum. The State for reasons the Court is not aware of, 
particularly in the case of a first degree felony conviction, did not reply to or oppose defendant's 
motion. The new trial issue is important enough to the citizens of mis State to cause the Court to 
carefully analyze the motion rather than grant it summarily due to the prosecution's failure to object. 
The Court, having carefully considered and reviewed the record in tljis matter and the memorandum 
submitted by the defendant, makes the following ruling and order: 
I. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
1. Defendant was present during voir dire of the venire panel inl this case. The Court asked the 
prospective jurors if any of them had any relationship or acquaintance with defendant and 
whether any of them had heard of the case outside of court. Prospective juror no. 3, 
Rebecca S., made a negative response along with the other prospective jurors. 
2. Both parties passed Juror Rebecca S. for cause. She eventually sat on the jury which 
convicted defendant. 
3. On the second morning of trial as soon as she came to the courthouse, Rebecca S. advised 
the bailiff she wished to make a disclosure to the Court. Based on her request, the Court 
conducted proceedings in chambers with her, defendant, and Counsel for both parties present. 
4. RebeccaS. disclosed she awoke in the middle of the night realizing she might have prior 
knowledge of the defendant through her husband. Although she did not recognize defendant 
or his name during voir dire, she did remember the name in the middle of the night. 
5. She indicated defendant's name was familiar and he might have gone to school with her 
husband. She explained her husband had talked about defendant briefly about a year before 
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trial. She had not spoken with her husband about defendant during trial, nor had she told 
her husband anything else about the trial. 
6. Regarding the conversation a year before, Rebecca S. said her husband told her about a 
confrontation at a bar about 25 years before, and before she met her husband, where 
defendant allegedly pulled out a gun. Her husband said the incident had been scary and he 
would never forget it. 
7. The Court questioned juror Rebecca S. regarding the impact of her husband's prior statement 
on her ability to remain impartial in the case. She affirmed she could remain fair and 
impartial and expressed her belief in the presumption of innocence, in giving people the 
benefit of the doubt and in doing the right thing. 
8. The State's attorney asked Rebecca S. if she could return a not guilty verdict if the State 
failed to carry its burden at trial. She stated she could. Defense counsel declined the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
9. The Court admonished Rebecca S. not to say anything to the other Jurors and excused her 
from chambers. The defense moved for a mistrial, arguing the core of the defense was that 
defendant was not dangerous and had not used a weapon, that Rebecca S. thought defendant 
had pulled a gun on her husband, that she was not rehabilitated by her own representation 
and that she might unconsciously influence the other jurors. The State's attorney opposed 
the motion. 
10. The Court denied defendant's motion citing the ruling in McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. 
v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984). The Court reasoned there was no misconduct because 
Rebecca S. did not untruthfully answer during voir dire as she at that time did not associate 
defendant with the incident her husband described. She did not make the connection until 
the middle of the night following voir dire, preliminary instructions, opening statements and 
some evidence. She advised the Court about it as soon as she could. Further, the Court 
found she would not have been subject to a successful challenge for cause. The Court based 
its ruling on findings that the incident was remote in time, did not involve Rebecca S. 
personally and she retained the ability to be fair and impartial. The Court also noted that 
Rebecca S., although visibly upset upon first entering chambers, calmed down when 
reassured by the Court and she was not upset about the incident itself. Rather she was upset 
because she thought she had done something wrong by not remembering her knowledge of 
the incident during voir dire. She stated her response to her husband's story was "like, oh 
really?" and she thought of it just as some high school-type incident 
11. After the Court ruled, defendant disclosed he remembered the incident in question, that it 
had happened in the early 1980's but at a different bar than that mentioned by Rebecca S. 
He said he remembered Rebecca S.'s husband. Defendant also disclosed that on that 
occasion he had actually danced with Rebecca S., that it was her husband who had the gun 
and that he, defendant, never brought a gun to a bar. Defendant did not disclose any of this 
during voir dire although he was seated right next to the jury box with unobstructed vision 
of Rebecca S. and the other jurors and supposedly saw her up close when he allegedly 
danced with her in the past.. 
12. The Court called Rebecca S. back for follow-up questions and asked if she ever met 
defendant before. She stated she had never seen defendant before the trial and the only time 
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she heard his name prior to trial was in the conversation with her husband recounted earlier. 
The Court gave each counsel an opportunity to ask other questions and both declined. 
13. Defense counsel renewed his motion for a mistrial in light off defendant's disclosures and the 
apparent factual dispute between his account and Rebecca S.'s account. 
14. The Court did not disturb its ruling, resolving the apparent factual dispute by finding both 
Rebecca S. and the defendant were telling what they believed to be the truth but that one 
or both parties did not remember some of the events because of remoteness in time. The 
Court also noted that it found Rebecca S. credible and truthful. 
15. Defendant later testified during trial. In retrospect, after hearing his trial testimony, the 
Court now believes it was too generous in stating it believed defendant thought he was telling 
the truth during the in-chambers hearing. Defendant's trial testimony was suspect at best and 
the Court now rates his credibility as low. Had the Court gone through the experience 
of hearing his trial testimony before the hearing with Rebecca S., the Court would not 
have stated it believed defendant. For purposes of this motion, therefore, the Court 
accepts as a matter of fact Rebecca S.'s statement that she never met defendant. It was not 
only what she believed the truth to be, but what the truth was in actuality. 
16. The trial proceeded forward and was completed that same day, September 3 0,2005, with the 
jury returning a guilty verdict on First Degree Felony Burgjl 
Criminal Mischief charges. 
ary and Class A Misdemeanor 
II. 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
Defendant argues he is entitled to a new trial because keeping Rebecca S. on the jury after 
she disclosed the incident between her husband and the defendant pad a substantial adverse effect 
on defendant's right to be tried by an impartial jury. Defendant argues Rebecca S. should have been 
removed for cause. Defendant further argues he would have exercised a peremptory challenge on 
her but was prevented from doing so by the circumstances because the jury was already empaneled 
when she disclosed her husband's experience. Thus, he was depriyed of his right to a peremptory 
challenge. 
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a trial court to grant a motion 
for a new trial "in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a party." Rule 18(e)(4) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides a prospective juror may be removed for cause for "the existence of any . . . other 
relationship between the prospective juror and any . . . person allqged to have been victimized or 
injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable 
minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free 
of favoritism." Likewise, Rule 18(e)(14) allows challenges for cause where the prospective juror 
has a "state of mind . .. that reasonably lead[s] the court to conclude the juror is not likely to act 
impartially." UtahR. Crim. Proc,rule 18(e)(14) (1999). Westv. Hdjley, 2004UT 97,1J13,103 P.3d 
708, quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f)(6). 
The Court's discretion in ruling on challenges for cause is limited in that removal of a juror 
is warranted when "conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances ... reasonably lead the 
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court to conclude a juror is not likely to act impartially. No person may serve as a juror, if 
challenged, unless the judge is convinced the juror can and will act impartially and fairly." West v. 
Holley, 2004 UT 97,1fl3,103 P.3d 708, quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f)(6). 
Respecting removing jurors for cause during trial, the Utah Supreme Court held "the test 
articulated in [McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984)] 
governs 'post-trial challenges to a juror based on the juror's alleged misstatements or omissions 
during voir dire.'" State v. Shipp, 2005 UT 35, If 15,116 P.3d 317 (quoting West v. Holley, 2004 UT 
97, Tfll, 103 P.3d 708). "The McDonough test mandates a new trial if the moving party 
demonstrates (1) 'a juror failed to honestly answer a material question on voir dire,' and (2) 'a 
correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause."' State v. Thomas, 830 
P.2d 243,245 (Utah 1992) (quoting McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556). It was this test the Court in this 
case referred to specifically in ruling on defendant's challenge. 
A. Juror Rebecca S. Did Not Fail to Answer a Material Question Honestly 
The first prong of the McDonough test states for a juror to commit misconduct, she must 
have failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire. Thomas, 830 P.2d at 245. In 
Thomas, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the approach that a juror's honesty in answering questions 
on voir dire be judged objectively. Id. at 246 (citing McDonough, 464 U.S. at 558 (Brennan, J., 
concurring)). The potential jurors in Thomas were asked during voir dire whether any close relatives 
had been a victim of a violent crime. Id. at 245. A woman who was eventually seated on the jury 
gave a negative response, even though her husband had once been accused of sexually abusing her 
son. Id. At a post-trial evidentiary hearing, the juror stated she answered negatively because it had 
not even crossed her mind that the alleged incident between her husband and son was violent. Id. 
The trial court found the juror believed in all honesty she did not need to respond to that question, 
there was no deceit or fraud in failing to disclose the incident and her conduct thus failed to meet the 
first prong of McDonough. Id. at 245-46. Although the Utah Supreme Court agreed the juror's 
nondisclosure was "purely inadvertent," the court nevertheless concluded she failed to answer a 
material question accurately. Id. at 246. The Utah Supreme Court reasoned "the emphasis should 
be on the juror's lack of partiality rather than on her intent" and a juror's intent or lack of intent in 
answering a material question on voir dire is irrelevant. Id. 
However, in State v. Shipp, the Utah Supreme Court recently dealt with a situation where a 
juror recognized a witness for the State from her employment at a hospital. 2005 UT 35, [^3, 116 
P.3d 117. In fact, while waiting in the courtroom prior to voir dire, the prospective juror asked the 
State's witness, a detective, if she knew him and if he ever came into the hospital. Id. The detective 
replied he did not know her but often went to the hospital. Id. The defendant moved for a mistrial, 
alleging the juror failed to honestly answer a material question on voir dire because she did not 
indicate she knew the detective when asked if she "knew or recognized the names of [the State's 
witnesses]." Id. at ^[21. The trial court found the juror had seen the detective before but did not 
know his name, had no knowledge of his involvement in the case before it and never talked to the 
detective before the brief encounter in the courtroom-she merely recognized an individual seen 
during the course of employment. Id. at ^[21. The Utah Supreme Court agreed that recognizing a 
person one has seen a few times does not amount to knowing that person. Id. at ^ [22. Therefore, the 
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juror did not fail to truthfully answer a material question during v6ir dire and the first part of the 
McDonough test was not negatively impacted. Id. 
Rebecca S.'s failure to disclose her prior knowledge of defendant is different than the 
situation in Thomas where the juror failed to disclose something she knew at the time. While her 
intent is irrelevant under Holly, supra,, the Court notes she did not consciously omit her knowledge 
of defendant because she did not recall the event in question during voir dire. She simply did not 
think of the incident described by her husband. If one cannot remember something, how can failure 
to answer about that thing be objectively dishonest? This is like asking someone if they know the 
temperature of the sun and they say "no" even though they heard the answer in school in the past and 
it comes to them later, after they answer. Their answer is objectively correct at the time because they 
don't remember. Saying the answer is objectively wrong because they knew the temperature at one 
time defeats the purpose of an objective standard-whether the person is being honest. The honest 
answer is "no" because the person does not remember and therefore does not know. 
More significantly, however, no one asked Rebecca S. on voir dire if she had ever heard of 
defendant. The Court specifically asked her (and the other jurors) if she had any relationship or 
acquaintance with defendant. She gave a negative response. We now know after the in-chambers 
hearing she answered this way because she did not recall ever having met defendant and also had not 
acquaintance or relationship with him that would jar her memory Like the situation in Shipp, 
supra, this was objectively a correct answer because she was not acquainted with defendant. Her 
only loiowledge of defendant was through an experience recounted to her by her husband a year 
before about her husband's confrontation with defendant 25 years ago, before she met her husband. 
Hearing about defendant in the past is different than being acquainted with or having a relationship 
with him, even had she remembered her husband's previous statement. Regarding defendant's 
testimony that he danced with her at the incident, she said could not remember ever meeting him and 
the Court finds her credible. Defendant, on the other hand, raised the claim of dancing with her only 
after the initial in-chambers hearing even though he saw her extensively in court the day before. It 
is interesting defendant claims in a double-standard manner she should have remembered a 25 year 
old encounter and raised it at voir dire when he himself did not do so through his attorney. In any 
event, given the Court's later insight into his credibility after hearing his materially unbelievable 
testimony, the Court concludes his version of events is not credible ajid Rebecca S. never knew, met 
or danced with him. 
The Court also asked the venire panel if any of them had he$rd of the case outside of court. 
Rebecca S. answered in the negative. Again, like in Shipp, her answfer was objectively correct. No 
one asked her if she had heard of defendant himself. 
Failure to remember something on voir dire does not necessarily constitute an objectively 
incorrect answer, particularly if the failure to respond was due to no question being asked that would 
call for such a response. The juror therefore did not answer dishonestly or incorrectly. The Court 
was convinced and determined the failure to respond did not call for excusal under McDonough. 
Given the additional evidence now available to the Court regarding defendant's lack of credibility, 
the Court is more convinced than ever there was no juror misconduct by Rebecca S. 
B. Juror Swenson's Disclosure Would Not Have Supported a Challenge for Cause 
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Having concluded the defense argument fails under the first prong of McDonough, the court 
need not address the second prong as it is stated in the conjunctive. However, assuming arguendo 
the juror did not clear the first prong hurdle, the Court would find the juror's answer would not have 
been a basis for a successful challenge for cause due to juror bias. 
The second part of the McDonough test requires that a correct response by the juror would 
have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. Thomas, supra, 830 P.2d at 245. Defendant 
argues Rebecca S. 's knowledge of the alleged incident between her husband and defendant twenty-
five years ago belies her impartiality and reveals her bias that defendant was a scary person prone 
to use of dangerous weapons. Because of her implied bias, defendant contends she would have been 
subject to a successful challenge for cause had she disclosed knowledge of the incident during voir 
dire. As support for bias defendant points to her disclosure that her husband told her a year before 
trial defendant was "scary," the incident was a "scary situation," and he would "never forget" the 
incident. 
"When a potential juror makes statements that raise a question about her ability to be 
impartial, the trial court must 'either excuse her or further question her about these relationships and 
determine whether she could act impartially.'" State v Calliham, 2002 UT 86,1J49, 55 P.3d 573 
(quoting State v Cox, 826 P.2 656,660 (Utah 1992)). Abuse of discretion may occur unless the juror 
is removed or further investigation rebuts any inference of bias. State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, [^27, 
24 P.3d 948. However, the Utah Supreme Court in Thomas made it clear that "the mere fact that a 
juror has had some family connection to a criminal act would not justify a challenge for cause." 
Thomas, supra, 830 P.2d at 247. 
Again, assuming the event described by Rebecca S. was enough to create a presumption of 
prejudice, the Utah Supreme Court in 2004 instructed courts how to evaluate a presumption of bias 
and rehabilitation of a juror. In West v. Holly, a civil personal injury case, a juror expressed as a 
small business owner that she believed worker's compensation claims were spurious in nature. She 
earlier failed to disclose her opinion during voir dire. 2004 UT 97, f6,103 P.3d 708. At a post-trial 
hearing on juror misconduct, the juror admitted she should have disclosed those experiences during 
voir dire. Id The trial court questioned the juror as to the impact of those experiences on her views 
and beliefs. Her responses suggested bias. Id However, she assured the trial court she could set 
aside her personal feelings and decide the case on its own merits. Id. The trial court found the juror 
would not have been subject to removal for cause and denied a motion for a new trial. Id. at ^ 7. 
The Utah Supreme Court plurality opinion held the trial court improperly relied on the 
juror's own assurances of her impartiality in light of her false answers during voir dire. Id. at [^10. 
The court reasoned a presumption of bias or partiality can be rebutted if the challenged juror 
"provides reason to believe that her previous statements were 'merely the product of a light 
impression and not one that would close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in 
opposition.'" Id at f 15 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988)). However, a 
presumption of bias "cannot be rebutted solely by a juror's bare assurance of her own impartiality" 
because the court must determine the juror's qualification to serve. Id. Thus, a trial court should 
focus on the juror's "attitudes, opinions, and feelings about subjects related to the case" instead of 
on the juror's assurances. Id. When voir dire evokes a strong emotional response, courts must be 
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aware the juror may not be impartial. Id. at f 16 (citing State v. Bfpoks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 
1981)). 
In the instant case, Rebecca S.'s disclosure about her husband's experience with defendant 
would not have supported a successful challenge for cause. The Court, not the juror, determined her 
qualification and impartiality. A separate hearing was held on the matter where the Court 
ascertained the details of her knowledge of defendant and elicited the statements her husband shared 
with her a year prior to trial. The Court allowed each side to question her until each indicated no 
further questioning was desired. The Court also recalled her for further examination after defendant 
belatedly alleged he remembered the incident differently. Upon hearing Rebecca S.'s responses and 
observing her demeanor, the Court, not the juror, found her credible and impartial. 
The Court found the incident was remote in time and did not personally involve Rebecca 
S. In fact, her husband only related the incident to her once after }|ears of marriage. Further, the 
Court found her initial emotional nature during questioning in chambers was not related to the 
incident itself but to her fear she might have done something wrong and might be in trouble for 
remembering it late. She also indicated the incident was merely a light impression in her mind, as 
she stated her response to her husband's story was "like, oh really?^' and that she thought of it just 
as some high school-level incident. 
While the defense contends the Court relied on her answers to make the determination, the 
defense fails to say how else a court could collect evidence to make such a ruling. It has to come 
from the juror's expression and demeanor. Brooks, supra, 631 P.Ed at 884. The Court certainly 
placed great reliance on the juror's assurances she could be impartial, her demeanor and her general 
expression of her belief in giving people the benefit of the doubt and being fair. The Court went 
into her specific attitudes about subjects relating to the instant case (It also did so the day before 
in voir dire and nothing elicited a response from her, especially not an emotional response. See 
Holly, supra, 2004 UT 97 at \\6.) The Court asked her an open-ended question of what impact the 
incident involving her husband and defendant would have on her ability to be fair in the instant case. 
By then she had heard the charges in the information, opening statements of counsel and some 
evidence. She replied she was a firm believer in giving the benefit of the doubt and could be fair and 
impartial. The prosecutor asked her if she heard the evidence and determined the prosecution had 
not carried its burden, could she return a not guilty verdict. She indicated she could. The defense 
did not desire further questioning although the Court here affirms ij is the Court's primary duty to 
ensure an impartial jury. The incident did involve her husband and he did indicate to her it included 
a gun and was a scary experience. It would theoretically be possible the knowledge impacted her 
more that she realized or admitted. However, the Court did not rely merely upon her own 
representations of not being biased but related the incident she revealed to the present case, evaluated 
her credibility and determined itself she could be fair and would return a not guilty verdict if the 
State did not meet its burden. 
C Peremptory Challenge 
Defendant's final argument is he was denied the ability to 
Rebecca S. Defendant assuredly would have exercised a peremptoify 
he known of her knowledge of the incident between her husband 
peremptorily challenge 
challenge to Rebecca S. had 
defendant. Why, if he arid 
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knew her and had danced with her, he did not have his attorney ask about it at voir dire reflects 
on his credibility as noted above. In any event, there is no constitutional right to a peremptory 
challenge and loss of ability to exercise a challenge in similar circumstances does not invalidate a 
jury's verdict. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). Defendant's argument further is 
inapplicable because we are dealing with a post-jury selection issue where giving defendant 
another peremptory strike is an unavailable remedy-the jury is already impaneled and another 
peremptory challenge would result in a mistrial because the jury would go from eight to seven 
members. Defendatnt's constitutional right to an impartial jury is under the McDonough rule 
rather than by evaluation of .his failure to peremptorily challenge a prospective juror he claims to 
know. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court determines defendant was not denied his right to a 
trial by an impartial jury. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, it is ordered the Motion for New Trial is Denied . 
Signed this ip day of July, 2006. 
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